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Abstract
Privacy policies are long and complex doc-
uments that are difficult for users to read
and understand, and yet, they have legal ef-
fects on how user data is collected, managed
and used. Ideally, we would like to empower
users to inform themselves about issues that
matter to them, and enable them to selec-
tive explore those issues. We present PRIVA-
CYQA, a corpus consisting of 1750 questions
about the privacy policies of mobile appli-
cations, and over 3500 expert annotations of
relevant answers. We observe that a strong
neural baseline underperforms human per-
formance by almost 0.3 F1 on PRIVACYQA,
suggesting considerable room for improve-
ment for future systems. Further, we use this
dataset to shed light on challenges to ques-
tion answerability, with domain-general im-
plications for any question answering sys-
tem. The PRIVACYQA corpus offers a chal-
lenging corpus for question answering, with
genuine real-world utility.
1 Introduction
Privacy policies are the documents which dis-
close the ways in which a company gathers,
uses, shares and manages a user’s data. As le-
gal documents, they function using the princi-
ple of notice and choice (Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 1998), where companies post their policies,
and theoretically, users read the policies and de-
cide to use a company’s products or services only
if they find the conditions outlined in its pri-
vacy policy acceptable. Many legal jurisdictions
around the world accept this framework, includ-
ing the United States and the European Union
(Patrick, 1980; OECD, 2004). However, the legiti-
macy of this framework depends upon users ac-
tually reading and understanding privacy poli-
cies to determine whether company practices
are acceptable to them (Reidenberg et al., 2015).
Figure 1: Examples of privacy-related questions users
ask, drawn from two mobile applications: Keep1and
Viber.2Policy evidence represents sentences in the
privacy policy that are relevant for determining the
answer to the user’s question.3
In practice this is seldom the case (Cate, 2010;
Cranor, 2012; Schaub et al., 2015; Gluck et al.,
2016; Jain et al., 2016; US Federal Trade Commis-
sion et al., 2012; McDonald and Cranor, 2008).
This is further complicated by the highly indi-
vidual and nuanced compromises that users are
willing to make with their data (Leon et al., 2015),
discouraging a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to no-
tice of data practices in privacy documents.
With devices constantly monitoring our envi-
ronment, including our personal space and our
bodies, lack of awareness of how our data is be-
ing used easily leads to problematic situations
where users are outraged by information misuse,
but companies insist that users have consented.
The discovery of increasingly egregious uses of
data by companies, such as the scandals involv-
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ing Facebook and Cambridge Analytica (Cadwal-
ladr and Graham-Harrison, 2018), have further
brought public attention to the privacy concerns
of the internet and ubiquitous computing. This
makes privacy a well-motivated application do-
main for NLP researchers, where advances in en-
abling users to quickly identify the privacy issues
most salient to them can potentially have large
real-world impact.
Motivated by this need, we contribute PRI-
VACYQA, a corpus consisting of 1750 questions
about the contents of privacy policies4, paired
with over 3500 expert annotations. The goal
of this effort is to kickstart the development of
question-answering methods for this domain, to
address the (unrealistic) expectation that a large
population should be reading many policies per
day. In doing so, we identify several under-
studied challenges to our ability to answer these
questions, with broad implications for systems
seeking to serve users’ information-seeking in-
tent. By releasing this resource, we hope to pro-
vide an impetus to develop systems capable of
language understanding in this increasingly im-
portant domain.5
2 Related Work
Prior work has aimed to make privacy policies
easier to understand. Prescriptive approaches
towards communicating privacy information
(Kelley et al., 2009; Micheti et al., 2010; Cranor,
2003) have not been widely adopted by industry.
Recently, there have been significant research ef-
fort devoted to understanding privacy policies
by leveraging NLP techniques (?Liu et al., 2016;
Oltramari et al., 2017; Mysore Sathyendra et al.,
2017; Wilson et al., 2017), especially by identify-
ing specific data practices within a privacy pol-
icy. We adopt a personalized approach to un-
derstanding privacy policies, that allows users to
query a document and selectively explore con-
tent salient to them. Most similar is the PolisisQA
corpus (Harkous et al., 2018), which examines
questions users ask corporations on Twitter. Our
1https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=com.gotokeep.keep.intl
2https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=com.viber.voip
3A question might not have any supporting evidence for
an answer within the privacy policy.
4All privacy policies in this corpus are in English.
5PRIVACYQA is freely available at https://github.
com/AbhilashaRavichander/PrivacyQA_EMNLP.
approach differs in several ways: 1) The PRIVA-
CYQA dataset is larger, containing 10x as many
questions and answers. 2) Answers are formu-
lated by domain experts with legal training. 6 3)
PRIVACYQA includes diverse question types, in-
cluding unanswerable and subjective questions.
Our work is also related to reading compre-
hension in the open domain, which is frequently
based upon Wikipedia passages (Rajpurkar et al.,
2016, 2018; Joshi et al., 2017; Choi et al., 2018)
and news articles (Trischler et al., 2017; Her-
mann et al., 2015; Onishi et al., 2016). Table.1
presents the desirable attributes our dataset
shares with past approaches. This work is also
tied into research in applying NLP approaches to
legal documents (Monroy et al., 2009; Quaresma
and Rodrigues, 2005; Do et al., 2017; Kim et al.,
2015; Liu et al., 2015; Mollá and Vicedo, 2007;
Frank et al., 2007). While privacy policies have
legal implications, their intended audience con-
sists of the general public rather than individuals
with legal expertise. This arrangement is prob-
lematic because the entities that write privacy
policies often have different goals than the au-
dience. Feng et al. (2015); Tan et al. (2016) ex-
amine question answering in the insurance do-
main, another specialized domain similar to pri-
vacy, where the intended audience is the general
public.
3 Data Collection
We describe the data collection methodology
used to construct PRIVACYQA. With the goal
of achieving broad coverage across application
types, we collect privacy policies from 35 mo-
bile applications representing a number of dif-
ferent categories in the Google Play Store.78
One of our goals is to include both policies
from well-known applications, which are likely
to have carefully-constructed privacy policies,
and lesser-known applications with smaller in-
stall bases, whose policies might be consider-
ably less sophisticated. Thus, setting 5 million
installs as a threshold, we ensure each category
includes applications with installs on both sides
6This choice was made as privacy policies are legal doc-
uments, and require careful expert understanding in order
to be interpreted correctly.
7We choose categories that occupy atleast a 2% share
of all application categories on the Play Store (Story et al.,
2018)
8As of April 1, 2018
Dataset Document
Source
Expert
Annotator
Simple
Evaluation
Unanswerable
Questions
Asker Cannot
See Evidence
PrivacyQA Privacy Policies 3 3 3 3
NarrativeQA (Kocˇisky` et al., 2018) Fiction 7 7 7 3
InsuranceQA (Feng et al., 2015) Insurance 3 3 7 3
TriviaQA (Joshi et al., 2017) Wikipedia 7 3 7 3
SQuAD 1.0 (Rajpurkar et al., 2016) Wikipedia 7 3 7 7
SQuAD 2.0 (Rajpurkar et al., 2018) Wikipedia 7 3 3 7
MS Marco (Nguyen et al., 2016) Web Documents 7 7 3 3
MC Test (Richardson et al., 2013) Fiction 7 3 7 7
NewsQA (Trischler et al., 2017) News Articles 7 3 3 3
Table 1: Comparison of the PRIVACYQA dataset to other question answering datasets. Expert annotator indi-
cates domain expertise of the answer provider. Simple evaluation indicates the presence of an automatically
calculable evaluation metric. Unanswerable questions indicates if the respective corpus includes unanswer-
able questions. ‘Asker Cannot See Evidence’ indicates that the asker of the question was not shown evidence
from the document at the time of formulating questions.
Figure 2: User interface for question elicitation.
of this threshold.9 All policies included in the
corpus are in English, and were collected before
April 1, 2018, predating many companies’ GDPR-
focused (Voigt and Von dem Bussche, 2017) up-
dates. We leave it to future studies (Gallé et al.,
2019) to look at the impact of the GDPR (e.g.,
to what extent GDPR requirements contribute to
making it possible to provide users with more in-
formative answers, and to what extent their dis-
closures continue to omit issues that matter to
users).
9The final application categories represented in the cor-
pus consist of books, business, education, entertainment,
lifestyle, music, health, news, personalization, photogra-
phy, productivity, tools, travel and game applications.
3.1 Crowdsourced Question Elicitation
The intended audience for privacy policies con-
sists of the general public. This informs the
decision to elicit questions from crowdworkers
on the contents of privacy policies. We choose
not to show the contents of privacy policies to
crowdworkers, a procedure motivated by a de-
sire to avoid inadvertent biases (Weissenborn
et al., 2017; Kaushik and Lipton, 2018; Poliak
et al., 2018; Gururangan et al., 2018; Naik et al.,
2018), and encourage crowdworkers to ask a va-
riety of questions beyond only asking questions
based on practices described in the document.
Instead, crowdworkers are presented with
public information about a mobile application
available on the Google Play Store including its
name, description and navigable screenshots.
Figure 2 shows an example of our user inter-
face.10 Crowdworkers are asked to imagine they
have access to a trusted third-party privacy assis-
tant, to whom they can ask any privacy question
about a given mobile application. We use the
Amazon Mechanical Turk platform11 and recruit
crowdworkers who have been conferred “mas-
ter” status and are located within the United
States of America. Turkers are asked to provide
five questions per mobile application, and are
paid $2 per assignment, taking ~eight minutes to
complete the task.
10Color blindness affects approximately 4.5% of the
worlds population (Deeb, 2005) We design all our crowd-
worker user interfaces to accommodate red-green color
blindness.
11https://www.mturk.com/
Word (%) Example Question From PRIVACYQA
Will 13.03
will my data be sold or available
to be used by third party entities?
Do 2.70 do you sell any of my information
What 1.84
what is the worst case scenario of
giving my information to this game?
Are 1.60
are there any safety concerns i
should know about using this app?
Can/
could
1.47 can i control who sees my data?
How 1.40 how secure is my stored data?
Where 1.14
where is my account info and
online activity stored?
Has 0.69 has there ever been a security breach?
If 0.61 if i delete the app will you keep my data?
Does 0.46
does the app save the addresses
that i enter?
Table 2: Ten most frequent first words in questions in
the PRIVACYQA dataset. We observe high lexical di-
versity in prefixes with 35 unique first word types and
131 unique combinations of first and second words.
3.2 Answer Selection
To identify legally sound answers, we recruit
seven experts with legal training to construct
answers to Turker questions. Experts identify
relevant evidence within the privacy policy, as
well as provide meta-annotation on the ques-
tion’s relevance, subjectivity, OPP-115 category
(Wilson et al., 2016), and how likely any privacy
policy is to contain the answer to the question
asked.
3.3 Analysis
Table.4 presents aggregate statistics of the PRI-
VACYQA dataset. 1750 questions are posed to
our imaginary privacy assistant over 35 mobile
applications and their associated privacy docu-
ments. As an initial step, we formulate the prob-
lem of answering user questions as an extractive
sentence selection task, ignoring for now back-
ground knowledge, statistical data and legal ex-
pertise that could otherwise be brought to bear.
The dataset is partitioned into a training set fea-
turing 27 mobile applications and 1350 ques-
tions, and a test set consisting of 400 questions
over 8 policy documents. This ensures that doc-
uments in training and test splits are mutually
exclusive. Every question is answered by at least
one expert. In addition, in order to estimate an-
notation reliability and provide for better evalu-
ation, every question in the test set is answered
by at least two additional experts.
Table 2 describes the distribution over first
words of questions posed by crowdworkers.
We also observe low redundancy in the ques-
tions posed by crowdworkers over each policy,
with each policy receiving ~49.94 unique ques-
tions despite crowdworkers independently pos-
ing questions. Questions are on average 8.4
words long. As declining to answer a question
can be a legally sound response but is seldom
practically useful, answers to questions where
a minority of experts abstain to answer are fil-
tered from the dataset. Privacy policies are ~3000
words long on average. The answers to the ques-
tion asked by the users typically have ~100 words
of evidence in the privacy policy document.
3.3.1 Categories of Questions
Questions are organized under nine categories
from the OPP-115 Corpus annotation scheme
(Wilson et al., 2016):
1. First Party Collection/Use: What, why and
how information is collected by the service
provider
2. Third Party Sharing/Collection: What, why
and how information shared with or col-
lected by third parties
3. Data Security: Protection measures for user
information
4. Data Retention: How long user information
will be stored
5. User Choice/Control: Control options
available to users
6. User Access, Edit and Deletion: If/how
users can access, edit or delete information
7. Policy Change: Informing users if policy in-
formation has been changed
8. International and Specific Audiences: Prac-
tices pertaining to a specific group of users
9. Other: General text, contact information or
practices not covered by other categories.
For each question, domain experts indicate
one or more12 relevant OPP-115 categories. We
mark a category as relevant to a question if it is
identified as such by at least two annotators. If
no such category exists, the category is marked
12For example, some questions such as ’What informa-
tion of mine is collected by this app and who is it shared
with?’ can be identified as falling under both first party
data/collection and third party collection/sharing cate-
gories.
Privacy Practice Proportion Example Question From PRIVACYQA
First Party Collection/Use 41.9 % what data does this game collect?
Third Party Sharing/Collection 24.5 % will my data be sold to advertisers?
Data Security 10.5 % how is my info protected from hackers?
Data Retention 4.1 % how long do you save my information?
User Access, Edit and Deletion 2.0 % can i delete my information permanently?
User Choice/Control 6.5 % is there a way to opt out of data sharing
Other 4.8 % does the app connect to the internet at any point?
Policy Change 0.2 % where is the privacy statement
International and Specific Audiences 0.2 % what are your GDPR policies?
No Agreement 5.4 % how are features personalized?
Table 3: OPP-115 categories most relevant to the questions collected from users.
Dataset Train Test All
# Questions 1350 400 1750
# Policies 27 8 35
# Sentences 3704 1243 4947
Avg Q. Length 8.42 8.56 8.46
Avg Doc. Length 3121.3 3629.13 3237.37
Avg Ans. Length 123.73 153.44 139.62
Table 4: Statistics of the PRIVACYQA Dataset, where
# denotes number of questions, policies and sen-
tences, and average length of questions, policies and
answers in words, for training and test partitions.
as ‘Other’ if atleast one annotator has identified
the ‘Other’ category to be relevant. If neither of
these conditions is satisfied, we label the ques-
tion as having no agreement. The distribution
of questions in the corpus across OPP-115 cat-
egories is as shown in Table.3. First party and
third party related questions are the largest cat-
egories, forming nearly 66.4% of all questions
asked to the privacy assistant.
3.3.2 Answer Validation
When do experts disagree? We would like to
analyze the reasons for potential disagreement
on the annotation task, to ensure disagreements
arise due to valid differences in opinion rather
than lack of adequate specification in annota-
tion guidelines. It is important to note that the
annotators are experts rather than crowdwork-
ers. Accordingly, their judgements can be con-
sidered valid, legally-informed opinions even
when their perspectives differ. For the sake of
this question we randomly sample 100 instances
in the test data and analyze them for likely rea-
sons for disagreements. We consider a disagree-
ment to have occurred when more than one ex-
pert does not agree with the majority consensus.
By disagreement we mean there is no overlap be-
tween the text identified as relevant by one ex-
pert and another.
We find that the annotators agree on the an-
swer for 74% of the questions, even if the sup-
porting evidence they identify is not identical
i.e full overlap. They disagree on the remaining
26%. Sources of apparent disagreement corre-
spond to situations when different experts: have
differing interpretations of question intent (11%)
(for example, when a user asks ’who can con-
tact me through the app’, the questions admits
multiple interpretations, including seeking in-
formation about the features of the app, asking
about first party collection/use of data or asking
about third party collection/use of data), iden-
tify different sources of evidence for questions
that ask if a practice is performed or not (4%),
have differing interpretations of policy content
(3%), identify a partial answer to a question in
the privacy policy (2%) (for example, when the
user asks ‘who is allowed to use the app’ a ma-
jority of our annotators decline to answer, but
the remaining annotators highlight partial ev-
idence in the privacy policy which states that
children under the age of 13 are not allowed to
use the app), and other legitimate sources of dis-
agreement (6%) which include personal subjec-
tive views of the annotators (for example, when
the user asks ‘is my DNA information used in any
way other than what is specified’, some experts
consider the boilerplate text of the privacy policy
which states that it abides to practices described
in the policy document as sufficient evidence to
answer this question, whereas others do not).
Acc. P R F1
Majority 24.75 24.75 100 39.6
SVM-BOW 75.75 50.8 58.5 54.4
+ LEN 76.75 52.7 57.5 55.0
+ LEN + POS 77.0 53.2 58.5 55.7
CNN 80.0 61.1 52.5 56.5
BERT 81.15 62.6 62.6 62.6
Table 5: Classifier Performance (%) for answerability
of questions. The Majority Class baseline always pre-
dicts that questions are unanswerable.
Model Precision Recall F1
No Answer (NA) 28.0% 28.0% 28.0%
Word Count -2 24.0% 16.4% 19.4%
Word Count -3 21.8% 17.8% 19.6%
Word Count -5 18.1% 20.3% 19.2%
BERT 44.2% 34.8% 39.0%
BERT + Unans. 44.3% 36.1% 39.8%
Human 68.8% 69.0% 68.9%
Table 6: Performance of baselines on PRIVACYQA
dataset.
4 Experimental Setup
We evaluate the ability of machine learning
methods to identify relevant evidence for ques-
tions in the privacy domain.13 We establish
baselines for the subtask of deciding on the an-
swerability (§4.1) of a question, as well as the
overall task of identifying evidence for questions
from policies (§4.2). We describe aspects of the
question that can render it unanswerable within
the privacy domain (§5.2).
4.1 Answerability Identification Baselines
We define answerability identification as a bi-
nary classification task, evaluating model abil-
ity to predict if a question can be answered,
given a question in isolation. This can serve
as a prior for downstream question-answering.
We describe three baselines on the answerability
task, and find they considerably improve perfor-
mance over a majority-class baseline.
SVM: We define 3 sets of features to character-
ize each question. The first is a simple bag-of-
words set of features over the question (SVM-
BOW), the second is bag-of-words features of
13The task of evidence identification can serve as a first
step for future question answering systems, that can further
learn to form abstractive summaries when required based
on identifying relevant evidence.
Privacy Practice NA BERT-U Human
First Party 0.22 0.36 0.67
Third Party 0.10 0.26 0.61
Data Security 0.24 0.42 0.74
Data Retention 0.02 0.33 0.67
User Access 0.07 0.32 0.66
User Choice 0.35 0.41 0.65
Other 0.44 0.45 0.72
Table 7: Stratification of classifier performance by
OPP-115 category of questions.
BERT
# Answerability Mistakes 137
% Answerable ->Unanswerable 124
% Unanswerable ->Answerable 13
Out-of-scope 2
Subjective 46
Policy Silent 19
Unexpected 6
Table 8: Analysis of BERT performance at identify-
ing answerability. The majority of mistakes made by
BERT are answerable Questions identified as unan-
swerable. These answerable questions are further an-
alyzed along the factors of scope, subjectivity, pres-
ence of answer and whether the question could be
anticipated.
the question as well as length of the question in
words (SVM-BOW + LEN), and lastly we extract
bag-of-words features, length of the question in
words as well as part-of-speech tags for the ques-
tion (SVM-BOW + LEN + POS). This results in
vectors of 200, 201 and 228 dimensions respec-
tively, which are provided to an SVM with a linear
kernel.
CNN: We utilize a CNN neural encoder for an-
swerability prediction. We use GloVe word em-
beddings (Pennington et al., 2014), and a filter
size of 5 with 64 filters to encode questions.
BERT: BERT (Devlin et al., 2019) is a bidi-
rectional transformer-based language-model
(Vaswani et al., 2017).14 We fine-tune BERT-base
on our binary answerability identification task
with a learning rate of 2e-5 for 3 epochs, with a
maximum sequence length of 128.
14We utilize the HuggingFace implementtation avail-
able at https://github.com/huggingface/
pytorch-transformers
4.2 Privacy Question Answering
Our goal is to identify evidence within a pri-
vacy policy for questions asked by a user. This
is framed as an answer sentence selection task,
where models identify a set of evidence sen-
tences from all candidate sentences in each pol-
icy.
4.2.1 Evaluation Metric
Our evaluation metric for answer-sentence se-
lection is sentence-level F1, implemented simi-
lar to (Choi et al., 2018; Rajpurkar et al., 2016).
Precision and recall are implemented by mea-
suring the overlap between predicted sentences
and sets of gold-reference sentences. We report
the average of the maximum F1 from each n−1
subset, in relation to the heldout reference.
4.2.2 Baselines
We describe baselines on this task, including a
human performance baseline.
No-Answer Baseline (NA) : Most of the ques-
tions we receive are difficult to answer in a
legally-sound way on the basis of information
present in the privacy policy. We establish a sim-
ple baseline to quantify the effect of identifying
every question as unanswerable.
Word Count Baseline : To quantify the effect
of using simple lexical matching to answer the
questions, we retrieve the top candidate policy
sentences for each question using a word count
baseline (Yang et al., 2015), which counts the
number of question words that also appear in a
sentence. We include the top 2, 3 and 5 candi-
dates as baselines.
BERT: We implement two BERT-based base-
lines (Devlin et al., 2019) for evidence identifica-
tion. First, we train BERT on each query-policy
sentence pair as a binary classification task to
identify if the sentence is evidence for the ques-
tion or not (BERT). We also experiment with
a two-stage classifier, where we separately train
the model on questions only to predict answer-
ability. At inference time, if the answerable clas-
sifier predicts the question is answerable, the ev-
idence identification classifier produces a set of
candidate sentences (BERT + UNANSWERABLE).
Human Performance: We pick each reference
answer provided by an annotator, and compute
the F1 with respect to the remaining references,
as described in section 4.2.1. Each reference an-
swer is treated as the prediction, and the remain-
ing n-1 answers are treated as the gold reference.
The average of the maximum F1 across all refer-
ence answers is computed as the human base-
line.
5 Results and Discussion
The results of the answerability baselines are
presented in Table 5, and on answer sentence
selection in Table 6. We observe that BERT ex-
hibits the best performance on a binary answer-
ability identification task. However, most base-
lines considerably exceed the performance of a
majority-class baseline. This suggests consider-
able information in the question, indicating it’s
possible answerability within this domain.
Table.6 describes the performance of our
baselines on the answer sentence selection task.
The No-answer (NA) baseline performs at 28 F1,
providing a lower bound on performance at this
task. We observe that our best-performing base-
line, BERT + UNANSWERABLE achieves an F1 of
39.8. This suggest that BERT is capable of making
some progress towards answering questions in
this difficult domain, while still leaving consid-
erable headroom for improvement to reach hu-
man performance. BERT + UNANSWERABLE per-
formance suggests that incorporating informa-
tion about answerability can help in this difficult
domain. We examine this challenging phenom-
ena of unanswerability further in Section ??.
5.1 Error Analysis
Disagreements are analyzed based on the OPP-
115 categories of each question (Table.7). We
compare our best performing BERT variant
against the NA model and human performance.
We observe significant room for improvement
across all categories of questions but especially
for first party, third party and data retention cat-
egories.
We analyze the performance of our strongest
BERT variant, to identify classes of errors and di-
rections for future improvement (Table.8). We
observe that a majority of answerability mis-
takes made by the BERT model are questions
which are in fact answerable, but are identified
as unanswerable by BERT. We observe that BERT
makes 124 such mistakes on the test set. We col-
lect expert judgments on relevance, subjectivity
, silence and information about how likely the
question is to be answered from the privacy pol-
icy from our experts. We find that most of these
mistakes are relevant questions. However many
of them were identified as subjective by the an-
notators, and at least one annotator marked 19
of these questions as having no answer within
the privacy policy. However, only 6 of these ques-
tions were unexpected or do not usually have
an answer in privacy policies. These findings
suggest that a more nuanced understanding of
answerability might help improve model perfor-
mance in his challenging domain.
5.2 What makes Questions Unanswerable?
We further ask legal experts to identify poten-
tial causes of unanswerability of questions. This
analysis has considerable implications. While
past work (Rajpurkar et al., 2018) has treated
unanswerable questions as homogeneous, a
question answering system might wish to have
different treatments for different categories of
‘unanswerable’ questions. The following factors
were identified to play a role in unanswerability:
• Incomprehensibility: If a question is in-
comprehensible to the extent that its mean-
ing is not intelligible.
• Relevance: Is this question in the scope of
what could be answered by reading the pri-
vacy policy.
• Ill-formedness: Is this question ambiguous
or vague. An ambiguous statement will typ-
ically contain expressions that can refer to
multiple potential explanations, whereas a
vague statement carries a concept with an
unclear or soft definition.
• Silence: Other policies answer this type of
question but this one does not.
• Atypicality: The question is of a nature such
that it is unlikely for any policy policy to
have an answer to the question.
Our experts attempt to identify the different
‘unanswerable’ factors for all 573 such questions
in the corpus. 4.18% of the questions were iden-
tified as being incomprehensible (for example,
‘any difficulties to occupy the privacy assistant’).
Amongst the comprehendable questions, 50%
were identified as likely to have an answer within
the privacy policy, 33.1% were identified as be-
ing privacy-related questions but not within the
scope of a privacy policy (e.g., ’has Viber had any
privacy breaches in the past?’) and 16.9% of ques-
tions were identified as completely out-of-scope
(e.g., ‘’will the app consume much space?’). In
the questions identified as relevant, 32% were ill-
formed questions that were phrased by the user
in a manner considered vague or ambiguous. Of
the questions that were both relevant as well as
‘well-formed’, 95.7% of the questions were not
answered by the policy in question but it was
reasonable to expect that a privacy policy would
contain an answer. The remaining 4.3% were
described as reasonable questions, but of a na-
ture generally not discussed in privacy policies.
This suggests that the answerability of questions
over privacy policies is a complex issue, and fu-
ture systems should consider each of these fac-
tors when serving user’s information seeking in-
tent.
We examine a large-scale dataset of “natu-
ral” unanswerable questions (Kwiatkowski et al.,
2019) based on real user search engine queries to
identify if similar unanswerability factors exist.
It is important to note that these questions have
previously been filtered, according to a criteria
for bad questions defined as “(questions that
are) ambiguous, incomprehensible, dependent
on clear false presuppositions, opinion-seeking,
or not clearly a request for factual information.”
Annotators made the decision based on the con-
tent of the question without viewing the equiv-
alent Wikipedia page. We randomly sample 100
questions from the development set which were
identified as unanswerable, and find that 20% of
the questions are not questions (e.g., “all I want
for christmas is you mariah carey tour”). 12%
of questions are unlikely to ever contain an an-
swer on Wikipedia, corresponding closely to our
atypicality category. 3% of questions are unlikely
to have an answer anywhere (e.g., ‘what guides
Santa home after he has delivered presents?’).
7% of questions are incomplete or open-ended
(e.g., ‘the south west wind blows across nigeria
between’). 3% of questions have an unresolv-
able coreference (e.g., ‘how do i get to Warsaw
Missouri from here’). 4% of questions are vague,
and a further 7% have unknown sources of er-
ror. 2% still contain false presuppositions (e.g.,
‘what is the only fruit that does not have seeds?’)
and the remaining 42% do not have an answer
within the document. This reinforces our belief
that though they have been understudied in past
work, any question answering system interact-
ing with real users should expect to receive such
unanticipated and unanswerable questions.
6 Conclusion
We present PRIVACYQA, the first significant cor-
pus of privacy policy questions and more than
3500 expert annotations of relevant answers.
The goal of this work is to promote question-
answering research in the specialized privacy
domain, where it can have large real-world im-
pact. Strong neural baselines on PRIVACYQA
achieve a performance of only 39.8 F1 on this
corpus, indicating considerable room for future
research. Further, we shed light on several im-
portant considerations that affect the answer-
ability of questions. We hope this contribution
leads to multidisciplinary efforts to precisely un-
derstand user intent and reconcile it with infor-
mation in policy documents, from both the pri-
vacy and NLP communities.
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